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A MONIST SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND A 
DUALISTIC SUPREME COURT: THE STATUS 
OF TREATY LAW AS U.S. LAW 
D. A. Jeremy Telman
*
 
Abstract 
Hans Kelsen identified three possible relationships between the 
international and domestic legal orders.  Dualism understands the 
international and domestic legal orders as separate and 
independent.  Monism describes a single and comprehensive legal 
order but can operate with either domestic law or international 
law as a higher order law.  Like many domestic legal orders, that 
of the United States has never fully worked out which of these three 
options specifies the status of international law in its domestic 
legal order.  While the text of the United States Constitution 
suggests a form of monism in which international law is 
automatically part of the domestic legal order, the structure of the 
Constitution does not permit such automatic incorporation.  In a 
2008 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated a theory that 
borders on dualism.  The Court’s decision makes sense of some 
recent U.S. practice, but it cannot be reconciled with either the text 
or the structure of the U.S. Constitution.  Moreover, as a 
consequence of the Supreme Court’s decision, the United States is 
in danger of re-enacting the de facto primacy of domestic law that 
the Constitution’s Framers sought to address by according 
constitutional supremacy to treaty law. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The status of international law in the domestic order varies 
dramatically from state to state.
1
  Hans Kelsen identified three 
basic theoretical possibilities that might describe the relationship 
between international and domestic law.
2
  Kelsen promoted what 
has come to be called “monism”; that is, the view that there is only 
one legal order of which international and domestic legal systems 
comprise parts.  Within monism, Kelsen entertained two options: 
either international law or domestic law could be at the top of the 
hierarchy of legal norms.
3
  Kelsen associated the primacy of 
domestic law with the ideology of imperialism and that of 
international law with the ideology of pacifism.
 4
  Although Kelsen 
himself claimed not to prefer one form of monism over the other, 
Kelsen scholars have identified international supremacy as a 
hallmark of his theory of international law.
5
  Only a few states 
                                                 
1
 Two recent English-language volumes provide a comparative perspective 
on the problem of the domestic application of international law: See 44 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 759–956 (2010); THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY 
ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (David Sloss ed., 2009) [hereinafter 
ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS].  
2
 HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 328–47 (Max Knight trans., 2d ed., 
1967). 
3
 Id. at 332–44. 
4
 Id. at 346–47. 
5
 See JOCHEN VON BERNSTOFF, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW THEORY OF 
HANS KELSEN: BELIEVING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (Thomas Dunlap trans., 
2010) (describing the thesis of international primacy as the central project of a 
Kelsenian “school” of international law). 
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have fully embraced international law primacy by providing 
mechanisms to automatically incorporate international legal norms 
into the domestic legal order.
6
 
In a dualist model, the international and domestic legal orders 
are independent of one another.  Kelsen regarded such a 
relationship between the international and domestic legal orders to 
be “untenable,” because in his view that would produce a world in 
which behavior that would be permissible in one legal order would 
be impermissible in another.
7
  That is, there would be categories of 
conduct which, no matter what an actor chose to do, would put that 
actor in violation of some legal norm.  This is not to say that 
Kelsen believed that domestic legal orders would always enforce 
international legal norms, but he was comfortable with the notion 
that legal norms could exist even if they were not enforced—or 
even if it took a long time for the proper authority to identify a 
violation and provide a remedy.  A legislature may pass an 
unconstitutional statute, and that statute creates a legal norm until 
it is rendered ineffective by a court or a supervening legislative or 
executive act.  Similarly, the fact that a state may adopt legal rules 
that are at odds with international legal norms is a temporary 
anomaly and does not, for Kelsen, give rise to a dualist system.
8
 
Most domestic systems are complex hybrids rather than 
instantiations of one of the available theoretical options.
9
  The 
United Kingdom is often described as having a dualist system, 
because Parliament must approve domestic implementing 
legislation before treaties and rules of customary international law 
can be introduced in the domestic legal order.  This model has 
been adopted in many of Britain’s former colonies, such as 
                                                 
6
 See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 183–87 (2d ed., 
2007) (discussing states with monist systems) (discussing variants on monism in 
five European states and Russia). 
7
 KELSEN, supra note 2,  at 328, 329. 
8
 Id. at 330–31. 
9
 David Sloss, Treaty Enforcement in Domestic Courts: A Comparative 
Analysis, 1, 6–7, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY (David Sloss ed., 2009). 
4  [MAY 2013] 
Canada, Australia, India, and Israel as well.
10
  But the fact that 
there is a mechanism for domestic implementation of treaty norms 
does not necessarily suggest a dualist system, so long as there is an 
assumption that international norms will be incorporated into and 
recognized as binding within the domestic legal order. 
At the time the U.S. Constitution was drafted, the Framers 
were well aware of the dangers of dualism.  During the so-called 
“Critical Period,” between the successful Revolutionary War and 
the ratification of the Constitution, the ability of the national 
government to operate under the Articles of Confederation was 
stymied in significant part because the states did not consider 
themselves bound by the national government’s international 
agreements, including the Treaty of Paris that was intended to 
effect a comprehensive post-war settlement with England.
11
  But 
the United States system is neither monist nor dualist; rather, the 
U.S. Constitution and U.S. constitutional history suggest 
ambivalence about the status of international law as domestic law. 
Part II of this Article begins with a discussion of the U.S. 
constitutional design with respect to the incorporation of treaty 
obligations into the domestic legal order.  Although the Framers of 
the U.S. Constitution clearly attempted to provide that treaties 
would have direct effect, with a status akin to that of acts of the 
national legislature, they did not come to terms with the difficulties 
such a monist design posed for the constitutional scheme, which 
envisioned both a federal system and a separation of executive and 
legislative powers.  Part III then addresses the development of the 
                                                 
10
 Id. at 7. 
11
 See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
43–45 (2007) (describing difficulties under the Articles of Confederation in 
enforcing both treaties and the law of Nations); David L. Sloss et al., 
International Law in the Supreme Court to 1860 7, 9–12, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE (David L. Sloss, 
et al. eds., 2011) (noting that under the Articles of Confederation, responsible 
treaty enforcement fell to the states, which often failed to comply with treaties); 
Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause 
and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 559, 616–19 
(2008) [hereinafter Vázquez, Treaties as Law] (citing discussions at the 
Constitutional Convention and the ratification debates). 
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doctrine of self-executing and non-self-executing treaties, 
culminating in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in 
Medellín v. Texas,
12
 in which the Court seems to have adopted a 
view on the status of treaty law that significantly diminishes its 
efficacy as domestic law.  The Article concludes by contending 
that Medellín has left us with a rule on treaty law that cannot be 
reconciled either with the text or the structure of the U.S. 
Constitution.  It neither gives treaties the status they ought to have 
under the Supremacy Clause nor does it adequately protect the 
constitutional separation of powers because, according to Medellín, 
either the executive branch or the Senate can give domestic effect 
to an international agreement merely by stating an intention to do 
so.  This bypasses the House of Representatives’ role in passing 
domestic legislation.   In addition, the Medellín decision makes the 
United States a de facto dualist state and could potentially give rise 
to the very situation that Kelsen described as “untenable.”  
Conduct that is required under domestic law places the United 
States in violation of its international legal obligations. 
The discussion here focuses on treaty law and will address only 
briefly the status of customary international law and international 
agreements other than treaties as part of the domestic legal order.  
In short, for prudential reasons, U.S. courts determined during the 
first half of the twentieth century that international agreements that 
are not treaties have the same domestic legal status as treaties.
13
  
The constitutional status of customary international law has 
become much more open to question in the past decade.  Until 
recently, there was a scholarly consensus, now known as the 
“modern position,” that customary international law is binding 
federal law.
14
  That view has been challenged by a group of 
                                                 
12
 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
13
 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (upholding assignment of 
property to the United States through executive agreement over objection 
grounded in New York state law); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 
(1937) (same).  See generally RAMSEY, supra note 11, at 174–93 (focusing on 
courts’ treatment of sole executive agreements as preempting state law). 
14
 See Carlos M. Vázquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A 
Critique of the Revisionist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the 
Modern Position, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1501 (2011) (defending the 
6  [MAY 2013] 
revisionist scholars.  In Erie v. Tompkins,
15
 the U.S. Supreme 
Court recognized that there is no general federal common law.  
Revisionists argue that, following Erie, federal courts no longer 
have the power to recognize substantive rights that sound in 
customary international law.
16
  Faced with an opportunity to decide 
the issue in 2004, the Supreme Court refused to do so.
17
 
II.  TENSION IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
Any discussion of the status of international law as U.S. law 
must begin with the Supremacy Clause, which states that all  
“Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be supreme Law of the Land” and must be 
enforced notwithstanding any state law to the contrary.
18
  This 
constitutional provision, taken on its own, seems to suggest a 
monist constitutional design.  Indeed, in his discussion of monism, 
Hans Kelsen provides a useful gloss on the purpose of 
constitutional provisions like the Supremacy Clause within a 
monist system: 
[The] primacy of international law is compatible 
with the fact that the constitution of a state contains 
a provision to the effect that general international 
law is valid as a part of national law.  If we start 
from the validity of international law which does 
not require recognition by the state, then the 
mentioned constitutional provision does not mean 
                                                                                                             
modern position and characterizing it as the view that “customary international 
law binds State actors and thus preempts State law applicable to State officials 
and private parties”). 
15
 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
16
 See Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, 
Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 869 (2007); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary 
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997). 
17
 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).  Numerous scholarly essays 
on the topic are gathered in International Law in the U.S. Supreme Court: 
Continuity and Change (David L. Sloss, et al. eds., 2011). 
18
 U.S. CONST. art. VI, ¶ 2. 
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that it puts into force international law for the state 
concerned, but merely that international law—by a 
general clause—is transformed into national law.  
Such transformation is needed, if the organs of the 
state, especially its tribunals are authorized (by the 
constitution) to apply national law; they can, 
therefore, apply international law only if its content 
has assumed the form of national law . . . .
 19
 
However, when the Supremacy Clause is considered in the context 
of the Constitution as a whole, neither the Constitution nor U.S. 
constitutional history provides unequivocal support for a monistic 
interpretation of the domestic legal order.   
The Supremacy Clause raises problems from the perspectives 
of both federalism, that is, the allocation of powers between the 
federal government and several states, and the separation of 
powers among the three branches of the federal government.  
While the Framers clearly wanted to resolve the federalism issues 
in favor of a federal government empowered to bind the states 
through treaties, they did not establish clear mechanisms for doing 
so and would have had difficulty doing so because the issue was so 
explosive.  Still, after a few controversies during the Early 
Republic, the issue did not arise in earnest until the late twentieth 
century.
20
  The separations of powers implications of the 
Supremacy Clause are far more vexing.  If treaty law automatically 
became incorporated into the U.S. domestic legal order, the 
executive branch rather than the legislature could be the source of 
domestic law. U.S. courts still struggle to specify how treaty 
obligations can have domestic legal effect without federal 
implementing legislation and to identify the mechanisms that 
provide private rights of action in domestic courts where 
obligations arising under international law have been violated. 
                                                 
19
 KELSEN, supra note 2, at 336–37. 
20
 See Michael P. Van Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1901–1945, in 
SLOSS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT:  CONTINUITY 
AND CHANGE 191, 194–206 (detailing how the Supreme Court routinely 
enforced the United States’ international commitments of domestic law in the 
first half of the twentieth century). 
8  [MAY 2013] 
A. The Supremacy Clause and Monism 
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution intended to incorporate 
treaties into domestic law with something like direct effect.  The 
purpose of the Supremacy Clause was to prevent U.S. treaty 
violations “by empowering the courts to enforce treaties at the 
behest of affected individuals without awaiting authorization from 
state or federal legislatures.”21  The Framers viewed this 
presumption of “self-execution,” as it came to be called, as a 
marked departure from the laws of England and to American 
practice under the Articles of Confederation.
22
  As Justice Breyer 
noted in his dissent in Medellín,
23
 the Framers thought the 
Supremacy Clause was necessary to prevent the federal 
government from being embarrassed by state regulation that 
substantially frustrated the government’s ability to comply with 
treaty obligations, as had occurred in the 1780s.
24
   
Although the drafters of the U.S. Constitution debated the 
matter and reached a clear consensus that treaties should have 
direct effect as domestic law, they did not specify how that result 
would be achieved.
25
  While James Madison hinted vaguely at a 
role for the House of Representatives in implementing at least 
some treaties, John Jay thought it acceptable if treaties were made 
binding without the approval of the legislature.  He did not view 
legislatures as the exclusive source of law, because courts can also 
make law.  Nor did he think it appropriate that the legislature have 
a power to repeal treaties, because treaties are a pact between two 
                                                 
21
 Carlos M. Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 98 AM . 
J. INT ’L L. 695, 696 (1995) [hereinafter Vázquez, The Four Doctrines]. 
22
 John T. Parry, Congress, the Supremacy Clause, and the Implementation of 
Treaties, 32 FORDHAM. INT’L L.J. 1209, 1217–18 (2009); Vázquez, The Four 
Doctrines, supra note 21, at 698.  
23
 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 543–44 (Breyer, J., dissenting, 2008). 
24
 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 270 (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1937) (J. 
Madison) (noting that the power of the federal government to enter into treaties 
was “frustrated by regulations of the states” under the Articles of 
Confederation). 
25
 See Parry, supra note 22, at 1223–27 (concluding that while the 
Constitutional Convention reached an agreement about treaties, “it failed to 
explore the implications of that agreement”). 
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states and one party should not be permitted unilaterally to cancel 
such a bargain.
26
 
The issues that the Framers failed to resolve at the 
Constitutional Convention gave rise to lively debates in the state 
ratification assemblies.  During the ratification debates, the 
supporters of the Constitution, known as Federalists, took a 
number of positions.  Nearly all agreed that treaties would be 
supreme law, overriding inconsistent state law.  Some went further 
and argued that all treaties would be self-executing and would 
trump federal statutes.  But leading Federalists, including 
Alexander Hamilton and Madison, acknowledged that, whether or 
not treaties were law, they could only be implemented effectively 
through action by both Houses of Congress.  Anti-Federalist 
positions mirrored those of the Federalists and were at least as 
divergent.  Not surprisingly, among Federalists, Madison seems to 
have had the greatest appreciation for the dangers self-executing 
treaties posed for the constitutional doctrine of separation of 
powers.  Unfortunately, Madison reached no clear conclusions.
27
 
B. Structural Constitutional Elements Suggesting Dualism 
In the decades that followed, constitutional tensions between 
the Supremacy Clause and both federalism and separation of 
powers doctrines became a source of political contestation. The 
states were reluctant to accept the supremacy of treaty law over 
their sovereign power.  At the same time, the House of 
Representatives sought a greater role in the approval and 
implementation of legal norms arising from treaty obligations.  The 
federalism issue was settled quite quickly and largely remained 
settled in favor of the federal government until the end of the 
                                                 
26
 Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 53, at 351–52 (J. Madison) (observing that 
treaty implementation will “sometimes demand particular legislative sanction 
and cooperation”) with THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 421 (J. Jay) (describing 
treaties as binding and “beyond the reach of legislative acts”). 
27
 Parry, supra note 22, at 1228–64 (reviewing relevant debates in the states’ 
ratification assemblies). 
10  [MAY 2013] 
twentieth century.28  Early in the nineteenth century, Chief Justice 
John Marshall introduced the distinction between self-executing 
and non-self-executing treaties in order to address separation of 
powers concerns. 29 
The U.S. Constitution provides that treaties are ratified by the 
President with the “advice and consent” of two-thirds of the 
Senate.
30
  The House of Representatives has no formal role in the 
approval of treaties, nor do the states, although because Senators 
are elected on a state-wide basis, they are supposed to represent the 
state interests in the federal government.
31
  If the President and the 
Senate can pass supreme law with direct domestic effect, they can 
bypass the House of Representatives and thus leave out of the 
legislative process one of the two houses of the legislature.  
Because Representatives are elected every two years,
32
 the House 
is the most democratically accountable branch of the U.S. 
government.  If the Framers’ purpose was to establish a 
representative government responsive to the wills of the electorate, 
it would be especially problematic if Congress’s legislative 
primacy could be bypassed through the treaty power.  Moreover, 
permitting the President and the Senate to bypass the House of 
Representatives through the treaty power would be politically 
                                                 
28
 See Lori F. Damrosch, Medellín and Sanchez-Llamas: Treaties from John 
Jay to John Roberts, in SLOSS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 451, 457–58 (noting that Medellín 
and other, similar cases rejecting the enforceability of treaty rights in favor of 
state procedural rules “arguably invert the priority established by the Supremacy 
Clause” and intimating that the Supreme Court would not have considered doing 
so until recently). 
29
 See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (finding a treaty 
between the United States and Spain to be non-self-executing).  But see United 
States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833) (reviewing the Spanish text of 
the same treaty and finding the treaty to be self-executing). 
30
 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 6.  
31
 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551–53 
(1985) (citing authorities on the ways in which the federal government is 
designed to be responsive to the interests of the states); RAMSEY, supra note 11, 
at 300–17 (noting that the treaty power was not originally viewed as a threat to 
the states because state legislatures controlled election to the Senate). 
32
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
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hazardous, because all appropriations bills must begin in the 
House.
33
  The executive branch could, with the blessing of the 
Senate, commit the United States to international obligations that 
Congress could prevent it from fulfilling.  The result would be an 
untenable dualism. 
Madison recognized this problem during the ratification 
debates.  Although he viewed treaties as supreme law,
34
 he 
acknowledged that commercial treaties might require “particular 
legislative sanction and cooperation.”35  Hamilton also recognized 
that some treaties could not be implemented fully without 
congressional participation.  At times, however, Madison 
suggested that the participation of the Senate alone was enough, 
and Hamilton concluded that Congress had a duty to implement 
obligations entered into through treaty.
36
  
The Framers thus transformed the legal question into a political 
question, and that is where things have remained to this day.  
While the House of Representatives has no formal, constitutional 
role in treaty making, treaties with domestic consequences require 
House approval for implementation.  If the United States were to 
enter into a treaty without first securing congressional support, it 
would likely take on an international obligation that it could not 
fulfill due to domestic impediments, thus putting the government 
in violation of its international obligations and negating any 
substantive or foreign policy benefits that might derive from 
participation in the treaty regime. 
III.  INTERNATIONAL LAW DUALISM IN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 
Because the Framers of the U.S. Constitution did not resolve 
the tensions between the Supremacy Clause and two structural 
elements of the Constitution, federalism and the separation of 
powers, the status of international law in the U.S. domestic order 
has been far more a product of U.S. constitutional history than it 
                                                 
33
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. 
34
 THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 295–96 (J. Madison). 
35
 THE FEDERALIST NO. 53, 352 (J. Madison). 
36
 THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 486 (A. Hamilton). 
12  [MAY 2013] 
has been determined by the text of the Constitution.  The 
separation of powers issue was resolved in part through political 
mechanisms and in part through the doctrine of non-self-execution.  
The federalism issue seemed resolved early in U.S. history in favor 
of treaty supremacy.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Medellín calls that resolution into question. 
The tension between the Supremacy Clause and the doctrine of 
separation of powers led almost immediately to a constitutional 
crisis over the implementation of the Jay Treaty with Britain of 
1794.
37
  The Jay Treaty was in part a commercial treaty, and as the 
Constitution allocates powers over international commerce to 
Congress, leaders of what would become the Jeffersonian 
Republican Party in the House of Representatives, including James 
Madison and Albert Gallatin (Jefferson’s Treasury Secretary), 
insisted on a congressional role in implementing the Jay Treaty.
38
  
Federalists sought to insist that treaties were supreme and that the 
House of Representatives had a duty to pass laws necessary to 
implement them.
39
  In the end, the House of Representatives 
narrowly approved appropriations to implement the treaty but 
refused to acknowledge its duty to do so.
40
   
Republicans in the House similarly objected to the surrender of 
a criminal suspect pursuant to extradition provisions of the Jay 
Treaty that had never been implemented through congressional 
legislation.
41
  Republican insistence on a role for the House of 
Representatives in the treaty process diminished markedly during 
Thomas Jefferson’s administration when it became necessary to 
bring negotiations with France over the Louisiana Purchase to a 
                                                 
37
 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Between His Britannic 
Majesty and The United States of America, 8 Stat. 116 (1794). 
38
 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 437 (1796). 
39
 Id. at 722.  Hamilton made similar arguments in the press.  See 20 THE 
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 3 ff. (Harold R. Syrett ed., 1974). 
40
 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1291 (___). 
41
 See Parry, supra note 22, at 1295–1303 (summarizing congressional debates 
from 1800).  
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timely conclusion.
42
  Nonetheless, Gallatin still insisted on the 
importance of the House’s role in treaty implementation.43  
These debates arose anew when President James Madison 
called upon Congress to implement provisions of the Treaty of 
Ghent, which ended the War of 1812 and which Madison ratified 
in December 1815.
44
  After lengthy debates in both Houses of 
Congress, the House and the Senate agreed on a compromise that 
left basic constitutional controversies unresolved but recognized 
two general principles that informed future treatments of the status 
of treaties as domestic law.  First, Congress developed the last-in-
time rule, according to which treaties could trump prior legislative 
enactments but Congress could also override a treaty through a 
legislative act.
45
  Second, Congress recognized that, while some 
treaties could have direct effect as domestic law and thus were 
self-executing, others required implementing legislation.
46
 
A. The Doctrine of Non-Self-Execution 
As discussed above, the Supremacy Clause and its legislative 
history suggest that the Framers intended for treaties to have direct 
effect as domestic law.  Evidence from the first decades of U.S. 
history enhances the sense that the Framers and their 
contemporaries assumed that treaties would be given direct effect 
as domestic law.  In the first case in which it weighed in on the 
issue, Ware v. Hylton, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the right 
of a British creditor to seek relief in a U.S. court under the 1783 
                                                 
42
 Although Jefferson at first insisted that a constitutional amendment was 
necessary before the President could double the size of the United States through 
a treaty, he ultimately bowed to expediency and advised Gallatin that the less 
said about the legal basis for the treaty, the better.  Matthew S. Warshauer, 
Constitution of the United States, in THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE: A HISTORICAL 
AND GEOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 83, 84 (Junius P. Rodriguez ed., 2002) 
43
 Parry, supra note 22, at 1294. 
44
 Id. at 1304–16.  
45
 The U.S. Supreme Court recognized this doctrine in Whitney v. Robertson, 
124 U.S. 190, 195 (1888) and Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese 
Exclusion Cases), 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889). 
46
 Parry, supra note 22, at 1316.  
14  [MAY 2013] 
peace treaty that ended the Revolutionary War.
47
 Ware may well 
have put to rest federalist challenges to the efficacy of the 
Supremacy Clause,
48
 but it did not resolve separation of powers 
questions relating to categories of treaties that called for 
congressional implementation. 
Confronted with this constitutional conundrum in 1829, Chief 
Justice John Marshall determined that treaties intended to have 
domestic effect cannot do so without some sort of legislative 
intervention:  “[W]hen the parties engaged to perform a particular 
act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial 
department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it 
can become a rule for the Court.”49  Marshall thus articulated what 
eventually became known as the doctrine of self-execution.
50
 A 
self-executing treaty is one that has “automatic domestic effect as 
federal law upon ratification.”51  Generally speaking, if a treaty is 
self-executing it creates a domestic legal obligation without the 
need for a congressional enactment.   
For much of U.S. constitutional history, treaties were largely 
assumed to be self-executing, and treaties that created private 
rights were assumed to give individuals standing to sue to 
vindicate those rights.  Justice Marshall himself embraced this 
notion as early as 1809, when he noted that treaties “stipulate 
something respecting the citizens of the two nations, and gives 
them rights.”  Marshall regarded it as a duty of courts to protect 
such treaty rights against all contrary laws and judicial decisions of 
                                                 
47
 3 U.S. (3 Dall). 199, 239 (1796). 
48
 Throughout the nineteenth century, the U.S. Supreme Court continued to 
embrace the doctrine of treaty supremacy over state law that it adopted in Ware.  
Duncan B. Hollis, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1861–1900, in, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 
55, 56 (Sloss et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter Hollis, Treaties in the Supreme 
Court]. 
49
 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). 
50
 See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (explaining that non-
self-executing treaty provisions “can only be enforced pursuant to legislation” 
and that such legislation is subject to congressional modification and repeal). 
51
 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 at 502 n.2 (2008). 
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states.
52
  So the doctrine remained throughout the nineteenth 
century.  As Justice Miller put it in 1884, 
A treaty, then, is a law of the land, as an act of 
Congress is whenever its provisions prescribe a rule 
by which the rights of the private citizen or subject 
may be determined.  And when such rights are of a 
nature to be enforced in a court of justice, that court 
resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the 
case before it as it would to a statute.
53
 
However, this presumption in favor of the applicability of treaties 
as domestic law was largely theoretical as, before World War II, 
the United States was a party to very few treaties that created 
private rights.
54
  In the second half of the twentieth century, when 
the United States’ treaties obligations exponentially increased, 
courts became more skeptical of the presumption in favor of self-
execution and they de-coupled the finding that a treaty was self-
executing from a finding that it gave rise to a private right of 
action.
55
 
B. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Medellín v. Texas 
In Medellín, the U.S. Supreme Court provided a method for 
establishing when treaties are to be treated as self-executing.  
Medellín was a Mexican national who was on death row in Texas, 
having been convicted on murder charges.
56
  Medellín brought a 
habeas challenge to his conviction and sentence, contending that he 
had been denied his rights of consular access and consultation in 
violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
                                                 
52
 Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 9 U.S. 344, 348 (1809). 
53
 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598–99 (1884); see also Hollis, Treaties 
in the Supreme Court, supra note 48, at 66–67 (noting that the Supreme Court 
“regularly applied treaties as law for individuals,” allowing them to invoke 
treaties directly and to affording them both rights and remedies). 
54
 Oona A. Hathaway, Sabria McElroy & Sara Aronchick Solow, 
International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 51, 53 (2012) [hereinafter Hathaway et al., International Law]. 
55
 Id. at 63–68. 
56
 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 501. 
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(VCCR).
57
 In Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Avena),
58
 the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) had found that the United 
States had violated its international obligations under the VCCR 
with respect to certain Mexican nationals in criminal custody in the 
United States.
59
  The ICJ ordered the United States to provide 
“review and reconsideration” of each challenged conviction and 
sentence to determine whether the Mexican nationals, including 
Medellín, had been prejudiced by the violation of their rights of 
consular consultation.
60
 
Although the United States disagreed with the Avena decision, 
President Bush issued a memorandum to the Attorney General, 
stating that the United States would comply with the Avena 
judgment by directing state courts to implement that judgment.
61
  
In Medellín’s case, the Texas criminal courts refused to do so. The 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Medellín’s post-Avena 
habeas petition as an abuse of the writ.
 
 The Texas court did not 
view either the Avena decision or the President’s Memorandum as 
capable of displacing state limitations on the filing of successive 
habeas applications.
62
 
In Medellín, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed.
 
In a decision 
written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court concluded that “neither 
Avena nor the President’s Memorandum constitutes directly 
enforceable federal law that pre-empts state limitations on the 
filing of successive habeas petitions.”63 As the Medellín majority 
put it, while treaties “may comprise international commitments . . . 
they are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted 
                                                 
57
 See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 
[1970] 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. no. 6820 (providing that foreign nationals in penal 
custody must be permitted to communicate with representatives of their 
consulate).    
58
 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 
31).  
59
 Id. at 53–55.  
60
 Id. at 72. 
61
 Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. 
Att’y Gen. (Feb. 28, 2005). 
62
 Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 
63
 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498–99 (2008). 
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implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that 
it be ‘self-executing’ and is ratified on these terms.”64  There was 
no implementing legislation for either the VCCR or the U.N. 
Charter provision calling on member states to comply with 
decisions of the ICJ.  Therefore, in order for the ICJ’s decision in 
Avena to bind the state courts that were to provide the review and 
reconsideration called for in Avena, the U.S. Supreme Court 
reasoned, the decision would have to bind the United States with 
the sort of direct effect derived from a self-executing treaty.   
The only treaty that came into question as potentially self-
executing was the U.N. Charter, Article 94(1) of which provides 
that member states are to “undertake to comply” with the decision 
of the ICJ.
65
  In order to determine whether or not Article 94(1) 
was self-executing, the Medellín majority had to specify the nature 
of the inquiry used to determine when treaties are to be treated as 
self-executing.  Its effort to do so was not entirely successful.   
Prior to Medellín, lower courts had largely relied on a 
multifactor balancing analysis to determine whether or not a treaty 
should be given domestic effect.
66
 The Medellín majority rejected 
the position of the Restatement (Third) of The Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States, which favored a presumption in favor of 
treating treaties as self-executing.
67
  Rather, the Medellín majority 
held that a treaty is self-executing only if it “contains stipulations 
which are self-executing, that is, that require no legislation to make 
them operative.”68  The Court thus subtly changed Justice 
Marshall’s rule that, consistent with the Supremacy Clause, 
rejected a presumption against self-execution.
69
  The rule laid 
                                                 
64
 Id. at 505 (citing Igartua–De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 
(1st Cir. 2005) (en banc)). 
65
 Charter of the United Nations art. 94(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, TS 
No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153.   
66
 See Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions and Non-Self-Executing 
Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 540, 540 (2008). 
67
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 111, Reporter’s Note 5 (1987). 
68
 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 505–06 (citing Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 
194 (1888)). 
69
 Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 11, at 629. 
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down in United States v. Percheman was that treaties would be 
treated as self-executing unless the treaty itself “stipulat[es] for 
some future legislative act.”70  The Medellín majority invented a 
requirement that there be some language, either in the treaty itself 
or provided by the President or the Senate, indicating self-
execution if a treaty is to be directly effective as domestic law. The 
Medellín dissent faults the Medellín majority for looking for “the 
wrong thing (explicit textual expression about self-execution) 
using the wrong standard (clarity) in the wrong place (the treaty 
language).”71  The majority accepts this characterization of its 
approach.
 72
 
The majority’s textual approach has a certain common sense 
appeal.  It seems reasonable to expect that, if the parties to a treaty 
expected that instrument to be self-executing, they would so state.  
However, as the Medellín dissent pointed out, the majority named 
no treaty that contains express language specifying that it is to be 
self-executing.  That is not surprising because international 
agreements generally do not reference the mechanics of domestic 
implementation beyond the occasional statement of an expectation 
that parties will take whatever steps are necessary to incorporate 
treaty obligations into domestic law.
73
   But the majority did not 
require such an express statement, as it repeatedly indicated that 
either the President or the Senate could at any point during the 
ratification process, express intent to have a treaty be self-
executing: “Our cases simply require courts to decide whether a 
treaty’s terms reflect a determination by the President who 
negotiated it and the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty has 
domestic effect.” 74 
In order to make sense of this approach to treaty interpretation, 
we need to review the way the United States takes on treaty 
obligations.  Treaty ratification is a three-step process in the United 
States. First, a representative of the executive branch signs the 
                                                 
70
 United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833). 
71
 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 562 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
72
 Id. at 514. 
73
 Id. at 547–48 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
74
 Id. at 521. 
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treaty.
75
  Next, the Senate provides its advice and consent,
76
 and at 
that time the Senate may attach reservations, understandings, and 
declarations.
77
  For example, in providing advice and consent to 
various human rights instruments, the Senate has attached 
declarations that the substantive provisions of such treaties are 
non-self-executing.
78
  Finally, the executive ratifies the treaty, and 
in so doing the President may make some statement about the 
domestic status of the instrument, although the constitutional status 
of such a statement is indeterminate, and Medellín did not make it 
any less so.
79
  After all, the Medellín majority did not think the 
President’s Memorandum directing states to implement the Avena 
decision was sufficient to render a treaty self-executing.
80
  A 
presidential statement made in connection with the deposit of an 
instrument of ratification should not be entitled to any different 
treatment. 
The Medellín majority held that Article 94(1) of the Charter 
could not be self-executing, because the language “undertakes to 
comply” suggests that some additional action by the state is 
required in order to give effect to an ICJ judgment.
81
  Indeed, the 
Charter contemplates the possibility that a state will not comply 
with an ICJ judgment and provides for a political remedy in 
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 RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. S. PRT. 106–17, TREATIES 
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 
SENATe 6–7 (2001) [hereinafter CRS, TREATIES]. 
76
 U.S. CONST. art II, § 2. 
77
 CRS, TREATIES, supra note 75, at 7–12. 
78
 See 140 CONG. REC. S7634 (1994) (recording reservations to the 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination); 138 
CONG. REC. 8068 (1992) (recording the Senate’s reservations, declarations, and 
understanding relevant to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights); 136 CONG. REc. 36192 (1990) (recording Senate reservations to the 
U.N. Convention against Torture); 132 CONG. REC. 2326 (1986) (recording 
Senate reservations to the Genocide Convention). 
79
 See Hathaway et al., International Law, supra note 54, at 99–100 
(acknowledging criticisms of presidential signing statements, but contending 
that presidential statements in connection with transmittal of treaty ratifications 
might require different treatment). 
80
 Id. at 527–28. 
81
 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 508 (2008). 
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Article 94(2) through recourse to the U.N. Security Council.
82
  
Finding that neither the U.N. Charter nor the VCCR provided a 
ground for treating the ICJ’s Avena decision as a rule of decision 
binding on the Texas courts, the Medellín majority affirmed the 
judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,
83
 and Texas 
proceeded with the execution.
84
   
At least with respect to non-self-executing treaties, the United 
States is thus returned to the condition it was in during the Critical 
Period.  The federal government has taken on a treaty obligation 
with which it cannot comply because the states refuse to recognize 
that obligations of the United States are also obligations of the 
several states.  Ironically, the self-proclaimed originalist Justices 
joined the majority and embraced an interpretation of the 
Supremacy Clause clearly at odds with the Framers’ understanding 
of that clause.
85
 
The Medellín opinion leaves room for considerable uncertainty 
as to what consequences derive from a determination that a treaty 
is non-self-executing.  As Duncan Hollis points out, calling a treaty 
non-self-executing may mean that: (1) private litigants cannot rely 
on it as a source legally cognizable rights; (2) such rights are not 
justiciable in any domestic court; or (3) that non-self-executing 
treaties do not have any force as domestic law.
86
  The Court also 
inserted in a footnote a rather troublesome bit of dicta, announcing 
its endorsement of a presumption that even self-executing treaties 
do not give rise to a private right of action,
87
 thus reversing a 
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 Id. at 509–11. 
83
 Id. at 532. 
84
 James C. McKinley, Jr., Texas Executes Mexican Despite Objections, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 6, 2008).   
85
 See D.A. Jeremy Telman, Medellín and Originalism, 68 MD L. REV. 377 
(2009) (contending that the majority’s ruling in Medellín cannot be reconciled 
with the types of originalism embraced by Justices Scalia and Thomas). 
86
 See Duncan B. Hollis, Treaties—A Cinderella Story, 102 PROC. AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. 1, 2 (2008); see also Bradley, supra note 66, at 548 (“The opinion 
leaves unclear . . . whether a non-self-executing treaty is simply judicially 
unenforceable, or whether it more broadly lacks the status of domestic law.”). 
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 See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008) (“Even when treaties 
are self-executing in the sense that they create federal law, the background 
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presumption that had long been part of U.S. law that self-executing 
treaties that created private rights also created a means of 
vindicating those rights.
88
  Recent research suggests that lower 
courts are interpreting Medellín to further reduce the domestic 
enforceability of international agreements, applying dicta from 
Medellín to prevent individual litigants from relying on treaties 
that were clearly intended to protect their rights.
89
   
C. Continued Tension Between Constitutional Design and 
Constitutional Practice 
The Medellín Court’s solution does not resolve the continuing 
tensions in the U.S. constitutional design regarding treaties.  On 
the contrary, it revives tensions sounding in federalism that had 
been put to rest in the Early Republic and exacerbates tensions 
sounding in separation of powers.  However, while the decision 
likely precludes the development of a satisfying legal theory that 
reconciles the Supremacy Clause with U.S. constitutional design 
and history, there are political remedies that can push legal 
uncertainties into the background. 
1. The Revival of Federalism Concerns 
Medellín revives the tensions between the Supremacy Clause 
and the principle of federalism that had lain dormant since the 
early nineteenth century.  The issue in Medellín was whether Texas 
could execute a murderer without granting him the review and 
reconsideration that even the Medellín Court acknowledged was 
required as a matter of international law.
90
  Although the 
Supremacy Clause states that courts must enforce treaty law 
notwithstanding state law to the contrary, the Medellín majority 
                                                                                                             
presumption is that international agreements, even those directly benefiting 
private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private 
cause of action in domestic courts.”). 
88
 Hathaway et al., International Law, supra note 54, at 53. 
89
 Id. at 70–76. 
90
 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 504 (“No one disputes that the Avena decision—a 
decision that flows from the treaties through which the United States submitted 
to ICJ jurisdiction with respect to Vienna Convention disputes—constitutes an 
international law obligation on the part of the United States.”). 
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effectively limited the efficacy of the Supremacy Clause to self-
executing treaties, a category that it defined in a way that would 
rule out treating almost all treaties then in existence as self-
executing.   
This aspect of the Medellín decision raises the specter of a new 
dualism, akin to that which plagued the country during the Critical 
Period.  Medellín is only the most recent case in which the 
Supreme Court effectively threw up its hands and declared itself 
incapable of requiring the states to comply with obligations of the 
United States arising under the VCCR.
91
  It is now clear that, 
notwithstanding the Supremacy Clause, courts are not in fact 
empowered to enforce treaties in the face of contrary state law.  
Seen in this light, Medellín effects a partial reversal to the 
nineteenth-century resolution of the tension between treaty 
supremacy and federalism.  Where federal treaty law once 
prevailed over contrary state law, state law now prevails over a 
treaty unless it is expressly self-executing (and very few are) or is 
implemented by Congress.  Because the Supremacy Clause clearly 
provides that congressional enactments supersede state law, the 
holding almost completely eliminates the efficacy of the 
Supremacy Clause’s reference to treaties. 
2. Persistent Separation of Powers Concerns 
The Medellín majority effectively masked the unprecedented 
federalism consequences of its decision by treating the case as 
posing separation of powers issues.  The Court reasoned that the 
power to implement non-self-executing treaties resides exclusively 
with Congress.
92
  The Court refused to construe as acquiescence 
Congress’s failure to either act or to object to the President’s 
memorandum directing states to comply with the ICJ’s Avena 
                                                 
91
 See LaGrand v. Stewart, 525 U.S. 971 (1998) (denying habeas petition of 
two German nationals challenging their convictions and sentences on the ground 
that their VCCR rights had been violated); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 
(1998) (denying habeas petition of Paraguayan national subject to death penalty 
while Paraguay pursued a claim in the ICJ against the United States for violating 
Breard’s VCCR rights). 
92
 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 527. 
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decision.
93
   This part of the decision seems like a resolution of the 
tension between the separation of powers doctrine and the 
Supremacy Clause by subordinating the constitutional text to the 
structural principle.  But Medellín does not do that either. 
James Madison and other Framers recognized that, in order to 
reconcile the principle of treaty supremacy with the separation of 
powers, certain treaties could not be effective as domestic law 
without congressional implementation.  Madison suggested that the 
category of such non-self-executing treaties might encompass all 
treaties containing subject matter that overlaps with Congress’s 
powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.  The 
Medellín majority articulates no such principled delineation of 
which treaties require congressional implementation.  Whether or 
not the President, with the approval of two-thirds of the Senate can 
make domestic law through a treaty turns, for the Medellín 
majority, on whether or not they state an intention that the treaty be 
self-executing as domestic law.   
Neither the Court nor subsequent commentators have identified 
a principled reason for giving the President and the Senate such 
unilateral power to override the House of Representative’s 
legislative powers.  Nor does the Court identify any constitutional 
reason why a treaty provision, like U.N. Charter’s Article 94(1), 
requires congressional implementation.  That is, the Court 
identifies no provision of the U.S. Constitution’s Article I, which 
enumerates legislative powers, that indicates that only Congress is 
empowered to enact legislation necessary to bring the United 
States into compliance with the judgments of international 
tribunals.   
Worse still, although the Court’s opinion is not a model of 
clarity on the point,
94
 the Court suggests that a statement by either 
the President or the Senate, or even by other parties to the treaty, 
before or after ratification may suffice to make a treaty self-
                                                 
93
 Id. at 528 & n.14.   
94
 See Bradley, supra note 66, at 544 (acknowledging that the opinion is 
“somewhat unclear” about whose intent a court should consult in determining 
whether a treaty is self-executing). 
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executing.
95
  Thus, for example, the President could state his 
understanding that a treaty would be self-executing after receiving 
the Senate’s advice and consent and without communicating that 
understanding to the Senate in advance of its consideration of the 
treaty.   Similarly, the Senate could make a treaty self-executing by 
stating its intention to do so during its treaty deliberations.  
Following Medellín, such a statement could be effective if the 
President is silent on the subject of self-execution.   
3. Political Solutions 
While the specter of an untenable international law dualism 
haunts the U.S. legal order, political mechanisms exist that can 
minimize the consequences of the current law’s incoherence.  In 
the space remaining, this Article addresses three such political 
options. 
First and perhaps most importantly, the political branches 
frequently bypass the rather onerous Article II requirements of 
advice and consent by two-thirds of the Senate, choosing instead to 
commit the United States to international agreements through 
executive-legislative agreements or through sole executive 
agreements.
96
  In recent decades, nearly ninety percent of the 
United States’ international obligations have arisen through 
mechanisms other than Article II treaties.
97
  Executive-legislative 
agreements require the approval of simple majorities in both 
Houses of Congress; that is, they are international agreements that 
are made binding as domestic law through the same process that 
applies to federal statutes.
98
  Sole executive agreements are mostly 
                                                 
95
 See id. (noting that the Medellín majority found its determination confirmed 
by the post-ratification understandings of other treaty parties).  
96
 Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of 
International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1238 (2008) 
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1980 and 2000). 
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 CRS, TREATIES, supra note 75, at 5. 
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used to bind the United States in its foreign relations and rarely 
have domestic consequences.  They bind the United States without 
any congressional participation.
 99
   
Under current law, there is no principled reasoning that 
determines when our government enters into international 
obligations through one method or the other.
100
  Oona Hathaway 
has argued that the United States could jettison entirely the 
cumbersome and constitutionally problematic treaty mechanism.  
Because they accord with our constitutional legislative processes, 
executive-legislative agreements have greater normative 
legitimacy and are more likely to achieve adherence.
101
 The use of 
executive-legislative agreements eliminates any separation of 
powers concerns because Congress implements the agreement as 
soon as it is entered into.  There are no federalism concerns with 
respect to such international agreements because there is no 
controversy regarding the supremacy of congressional enactments 
over state law.   
Most sole executive agreements do not raise federalism issues.  
Courts have for the most part recognized their supremacy over 
state law pursuant to the Presidents foreign affairs powers.
102
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Supreme Court struck down, by a 5–4 vote, a California insurance regulation act 
on the ground that it interfered with the President’s ability to conduct foreign 
relations). 
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However, their relationship to federal statutes remains unsettled.
103
  
The problem is not particularly troubling because the executive 
utilizes this form of international agreement primarily to govern 
relations between the United States and other states or international 
entities, and the authority of the President to do so as the “sole 
organ” of U.S. foreign relations is widely acknowledged.104  
Second, given the need for congressional cooperation on the 
implementation of treaties that have domestic consequences, the 
President simply ought not to ratify treaties unless and until he has 
lined up support for the required implementing legislation.  To the 
extent that the domestic implementation of a treaty regime costs 
money, this is true whether the treaty is self-executing or non-self-
executing.  Either way, if the treaty is to have domestic efficacy, 
Congress must appropriate money, and so there is no point in 
entering into a treaty regime without first securing support for that 
regime in both Houses of Congress.  Indeed, because the 
Constitution requires the President to “take care” that the laws are 
faithfully executed,
105
 the President may have a constitutional duty 
to ensure such support and such implementation.  To the extent 
that treaties are laws, the President has a constitutional duty to 
ensure that Congress implements substantive treaty provisions.
106
 
Finally, if all else fails and the United States is unable to abide 
by its international obligations by incorporating treaty norms into 
the domestic legal order, the President should give appropriate 
notice and lawfully withdraw the United States from the treaty 
regime.
107
  This solution is obviously not optimal, but it at least 
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prevents any U.S. violation of its treaty obligations from being 
long-standing. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
While the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause contemplates 
a monist system in which treaty obligations would automatically 
become a part of the U.S. domestic legal order, structural, 
constitutional impediments, sounding in principles of federalism 
and separation of powers, present challenges to automatic treaty 
supremacy.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín further 
complicates these structural impediments to monism and in fact 
puts the United States on a path towards a dualist model that could 
negatively affect U.S. foreign relations.  The United States has thus 
far been able to exploit its economic, diplomatic, and military 
strength to avoid any legal penalties that have arisen from its 
violation of its international treaty obligations.  As a result, its 
current practice more resembles a dualist system, in which the 
federal government makes certain international commitments that 
it is unable to incorporate into the domestic legal order.  There 
being no readily identifiable legal penalties for the resulting 
breaches, there really are two distinct legal orders; one pertaining 
to the United States in the conduct of its foreign affairs, and 
another pertaining to the United States in the conduct of its 
domestic affairs.   
Should the United States relinquish its status as the world’s 
lone remaining superpower, it may be forced to confront the 
consequences of this dualism.  There may be, from a legal 
perspective, no way to reconcile the Supremacy Clause’s monism 
with federalism and separation of powers principles.  It thus falls to 
the political branches to work out a political solution so as to avoid 
repeated lapses in the United States’ fulfillment of its treaty 
obligations. 
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